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ABSTRACT As a very attractive computing paradigm, cloud computing makes it possible for resource-
constrained users to enjoy cost-effective and flexible resources of diversity. Considering the untrustworthi-
ness of cloud servers and the data privacy of users, it is necessary to encrypt the data before outsourcing it to
the cloud. However, the form of encrypted storage also poses a series of problems, such as: How can users
search over the outsourced data? How to realize user-side verifiability of search results to resist malicious
cloud servers? How to enable server-side verifiability of outsourced data to check malicious data owners?
How to achieve payment fairness between the user and the cloud without introducing any third party?
Towards addressing these challenging issues, in this paper, we introduce TKSE, a trustworthy keyword search
scheme over encrypted data without any third party, trusted or not. In TKSE, the encrypted data index based
on digital signature allows a user to search over the outsourced encrypted data and check whether the search
result returned by the cloud fulfills the pre-specified search requirements. In particular, for the first time,
TKSE realizes server-side verifiability which protects honest cloud servers from being framed by malicious
data owners in the data storage phase. Furthermore, blockchain technologies and hash functions are used to
enable payment fairness of search fees without introducing any third party even if the user or the cloud is
malicious. Our security analysis and performance evaluation indicate that TKSE is secure and efficient and
it is suitable for cloud computing.
INDEX TERMS Blockchain, cloud computing, fair payment, searchable encryption, verifiability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has attracted an increasing number of
individuals and organizations to outsource their data to
third-party platforms for infinite computing and storage
capacity available on demand with inexpensiveness and
convenience [1], [2]. Considering the untrustworthiness of
cloud servers and the data privacy of users, it is necessary to
encrypt the data before outsourcing it to the cloud. However,
the direct use of traditional encryption technologies deprives
users of search capability and thus results in a poor user expe-
rience. In order to preserve the search functionality, search-
able encryption technologies have been developed in two
representative settings including the symmetric-key
setting [3] and the public-key setting [4]. In this paper,
we focus on the former, that is, searchable symmetric encryp-
tion (SSE), which is usually more practical than the latter in
terms of efficiency. However, many important and challeng-
ing issues have not been well studied in SSE, such as user-
side verifiability and server-side verifiability as illustrated
in Figure 1, fair payment, and no trusted third party.
In fact, user-side verifiability takes into consideration that
the cloud server may be malicious, that is, the cloud server
may only return part of search results or maliciously return
incorrect results. The issue of user-side verifiability is firstly
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FIGURE 1. The scenario of two-side verifiability in SSE.
addressed in [5] and [6]. However, these two schemes cannot
support server-side verifiability and fair payment without any
trusted third party. Furthermore, server-side verifiability takes
into consideration that the data owner may be malicious,
that is, the data owner may maliciously outsource invalid
data in the data storage phase and fraudulently claim com-
pensation later. This concern has not been addressed and
even has received little attention in the literature. Last but
not least, most of the previous schemes are bank-dependent.
Specifically, either the payment issue is not considered or the
default traditional payment mechanism is exploited in which
a trusted third party (TTP) such as a trustworthy bank has
to be introduced for payment fairness. Payment fairness can
promote the honest behaviors of users and cloud servers [7].
If a malicious behavior is detected based on the user-side
verifiability (resp. server-side verifiability), the data owner
(resp. cloud server) should get adequate compensation from
the cloud server (resp. data owner) no matter what the cloud
server (resp. data owner) does. Therefore, fair payment with-
out any third party is a meaningful and challenging task and
it remains in SSE.
In order to throughly address the aforementioned chal-
lenging issues in cloud computing, we propose TKSE,
a Trustworthy Keyword Search scheme over Encrypted data
without needing any third party. TKSE is proven secure
and our performance evaluation shows its efficiency. In par-
ticular, TKSE is characterized by the following desirable
features.
• Keyword Search over Encrypted Data. The encrypted
data index based on the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) allows a user to search over the
outsourced encrypted data.
• User-side Verifiability. In TKSE, a data owner can
embed search requirements into the output script of
a joint transaction such that the transaction can be
redeemed by the cloud server if and only if the output
script evaluates to true based on the returned search
result. Therefore, TKSE enables the data owner to resist
malicious cloud servers and user-side verifiability is
realized.
• Server-side Verifiability. Similar to user-side verifiabil-
ity, the public verification of digital signature enables
the cloud server to check the validness of the outsourced
encrypted data from the data owner in the data storage
phase. Thus, malicious data owners can be detected by
the cloud server, which realizes server-side verifiability.
• Fair Payment and No TTP. Based on hash functions
and ECDSA, TKSE is compatible with blockchains
such as the Bitcoin blockchain and the Ethereum
blockchain. The global consensus and distributed nature
of a blockchain enable a fair payment mechanism in
TKSE without introducing any TTP.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The related
work is discussed in Section II. Some preliminaries are
reviewed in Section III. We then formulate problems in
Section IV. In Section V, we describe the proposed TKSE
scheme in detail. Security analysis and performance evalua-
tion are given in Section VI. Finally, concluding remarks are
made in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, cloud computing technologies have gotten
rapid developments and a line of studies have been done
on security issues in cloud computing, such as access con-
trol [8]–[13] and privacy protection [14]–[19]. As a typi-
cal service in cloud computing, cloud storage needs both
data security and search functionality. To realize keyword
search on remote encrypted data, Song et al. [3] proposed the
first searchable encryption scheme in the symmetric setting,
in which each keyword is encrypted independently under a
two-layer encryption construction. Boneh et al. [4] proposed
the first public-key based searchable encryption scheme.
Li et al. proposed [20] the first fuzzy keyword search over
encrypted data in cloud computing. Curtmola et al. [21] first
considered the adaptive security of SSE and presented two
index-based schemes. Li et al. [22]m proposed a lightweight
framework for privacy-aware data queries in cloud comput-
ing. However, all the above schemes assume that the cloud
server is honest and the returned search result is correct
without considering user-side verifiability. In order to resist
selfish cloud servers, Kurosawa and Ohtaki [5] first proposed
a SSE schemewith user-side verifiability based on [21]. User-
side verifiability has also been realized in SSE [6], fuzzy
SSE [23], attribute-based keyword search [24], and database
update [25], [26]. In these schemes, however, malicious data
owners may outsource invalid encrypted data to the cloud
server for fraudulent compensation in the future. Similar
issues also exist in secure deduplication and data integrity
in cloud computing [27]–[29]. Server-side verifiability can
be used to tackle this problem but it has not been found in
the literature. In addition, all the above schemes are bank-
dependent. To be specific, either the payment issue is not
taken into account or a TTP is inevitably introduced for fair
payment.
To solve the payment fairness issue in cloud com-
puting, blockchain technologies have been taken into
account [30], [31]. Andrychowicz et al. [32] proposed secure
multiparty lottery protocols based on the Bitcoin blockchain,
in which a bitcoin-based timed commitment scheme serves
as the main ingredient. In order to realize more general
computation, Andrychowicz et al. [33] proposed a two-
party computation protocol, which is not compatible with the
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Bitcoin blockchain because it modifies the Bitcoin spec-
ification to resist malleability attacks. Similar ideas were
developed independently by Bentov and Kumaresan [34].
Li et al. [35] proposed a blockchain-based SSE scheme,
which requires the miners of the blockchain to do some
particular tasks, such as decryption, and hence violates the
Bitcoin specification. Many other blockchain-based SSE
schemes can be found in [36]–[39], in which the server-side
verifiability remains to be addressed. Besides, blockchain
technologies have also been used in outsourcing com-
putation [40], accountable storage [41] and is combined
with attribute-based signature [42] and homomorphic sig-
nature [43]. It is noticeable that all these schemes are not
compatible with the Bitcoin blockchain, where the scripts are
very limited [44]. For example, the string concatenation is
currently disabled in Bitcoin scripts.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. NOTATIONS
In Table 1, we summarize important notations used in TKSE
for ease of reference.
TABLE 1. Notations used in TKSE.
B. BLOCKCHAIN
As an essential technology behind Bitcoin [30] and
Ethereum [31], the idea of blockchain is that the longest
chain is accepted as the proper one. In TKSE, the bitcoin-
based timed commitment scheme [32] is used to resist mali-
cious behaviors, which is also adopted by [40] and [41]. The
commitment scheme is denoted by CS(User,CSP, d, t, s)
and is executed between User and CSP. Here, User and
CSP represent the user and the cloud service provider
in TKSE. They act as the committer and the receipt in
the commitment scheme, respectively. Concretely, CSP
commits to a secret s and has to open the commitment
before a specific time t to get his/her deposit of value
d B back. Otherwise, the deposit will be redeemed by
User. The commitment scheme consists of three phases: the
commitment phase CS.Commit(CSP,User, d, t, s), the
opening phase CS.Open(CSP,User, d, t, s) and the pun-
ishment phase CS.Fine(CSP,User, d, t, s). Note that the
punishment phase is performed only if the opening phase
is not correctly performed. Please refer to [32] for more
details.
C. SPECIFICATION OF TWO-SIDE VERIFIABLE SSE
A two-side V-SSE scheme is composed of seven polynomial
time algorithms (KeyGen,Encrypt,BuildIndex,Trapdoor,
Search,Verify,Decrypt) as below. The specification is the
same as the one given in [5] except that index generation is
separated from data encryption for clarity and the index is
publicly verifiable.
• KeyGen(1λ) → K : Given a security parameter, it out-
puts a secret key K .
• Encrypt(K ,D) → C: Given K , a document set D,
it outputs a ciphertext data set C.
• BuildIndex(K ,D, C,W) → I: Given K , D, C and a
keyword set W , it outputs an index set I. Note that C
andW can be generated based onK andD.We explicitly
take them as inputs for the simplicity of exposition.
• Trapdoor(K , ω) → Tω: Given K and a keyword ω,
it outputs a trapdoor Tω associated with ω.
• Search(I, C,Tω) → (Cω, tagω): Given I, C and Tω,
it outputs a ciphertext data set Cω and a tag set tagω
associated with ω.
• Verify(Tω, Cω, tagω)→ 1 or 0: Given Tω, Cω and tagω,
it outputs 1 if the search result is valid and 0 otherwise.
• Decrypt(K , C)→ D: Given K , C, it outputs D.
In Section V, the design of TKSE is described in detail. We
will see that an underlying two-side V-SSE scheme is used in
TKSE, in whichKeyGen,Encrypt andDecrypt are based on
a symmetric encryption algorithm, and verifiable BuildIndex
is based on a digital signature.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Figure 2, the entities involved in TKSE include
a data owner, a data consumer, a cloud service provider
(i.e., CSP) and a blockchain. In TKSE, we focus on search-
able symmetric encryption. In other words, the data owner
and the data consumer are essentially the same entity (i.e.,
User) because they share a secret key. Suppose User intends
to outsource some documents to CSP while keeping data
confidentiality, searching ability and verifiability. The main
procedures are presented in Figure 2. Obviously, TKSE
consists of three phases including data storage phase, data
search phase and user claim phase. In the data storage
phase, User generates encrypted data and index by pro-
cedure (1) and outsources them to CSP. Based on pro-
cedure (2), data storage is enforced by CSP after ensur-
ing its validness. Procedures (3.1) and (3.2) are used by
User to confirm the enforcement of data storage. On the
other hand, data search is enabled by procedures (4), (5.1),
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FIGURE 2. The system model of TKSE. (a) Data Storage Phase. (b) Data Search and User Claim Phase.
(5.2), (6), (7.1) and (7.2). The search request is based on
procedure (4) and the search commitment is realized in
procedures (5.1) and (5.2). The payment commitment is
based on procedure (6). Procedures (7.1) and (7.2) are used
to realize verification and payment. Finally, procedure (8)
allows User to claim compensation due to search payment
if the search result is invalid in the data search phase.
In TKSE, a public blockchain is considered, such as the
Bitcoin blockchain and the Ethereum blockchain.
B. ADVERSARY MODEL AND DESIGN GOALS
In TKSE, both User and CSP can be malicious and they
are of mutual distrust. Specifically, the following malicious
behaviors should be taken into consideration.
• Case 1. Malicious CSP may try to learn information
on secret keys and original documents of User from
trapdoor and ciphertext data.
• Case 2.MaliciousCSPmay forge search results or return
partial results.
• Case 3.Malicious Usermay defraud CSP for compen-
sation by outsourcing invalid ciphertext data and index
to CSP in the data storage phase.
• Case 4.Malicious CSP aims to obtain search fees from
User without providing search results satisfying the
requirements of User.
• Case 5.MaliciousUserwants to get valid search results
from CSP without paying the search fee.
Considering the above attacks, the design goals of TKSE
are as follows.1
• Privacy. In TKSE, it is impossible for CSP to learn any
information on secret keys and original documents. This
goal is against the attack in Case 1.
1As shown in Section VI, TKSE achieves privacy and user-side verifiabil-
ity in the universal composability framework similar to [5].
• User-side Verifiability. It is the same as the property
reliability in [5]. This goal is against the attack inCase 2.
That is, CSP cannot forge valid search results or return
partial results.
• Server-side Verifiability. This goal is against the attack
in Case 3 and it can protect CSP from being framed by
malicious User.
• Fair Payment. This goal is against attacks inCase 4 and
Case 5. Specifically, fairness ensures that User can get
valid search results only if corresponding search fees are
paid to CSP. On the other hand, CSP obtains search
fees from User only if satisfactory search results are
returned.
In addition, considering that blockchain technologies are
used in TKSE, the following attractive properties should be
achieved.
• No TTP. It means that payment fairness is realized
without introducing any TTP.
• Compatibility. TKSE should be compatible with main-
stream blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum.
Note that if TKSE is compatible with the Bit-
coin blockchain, then it is compatible with Ethereum
blockchains [44], [45].
C. DEFINITION OF TKSE
TKSE is composed of four phases including the initialization
phase, the data storage phase, the data search phase and the
user claim phase. The first three phases are compulsory and
the user claim phase is performed by User when CSP is
malicious. The definition of TKSE is as follows.
1) INITIALIZATION
User and CSP initialize parameters to be used in the subse-
quent phases, such as their own secret keys and unredeemed
transactions on the blockchain.
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2) DATA STORAGE PHASE
The outsourcing of data storage is implemented in this phase.
Four procedures, data encryption, index generation, storage
enforcement and storage confirmation, are sequentially per-
formed as follows.
• Data Encryption: For confidentiality, User encryptsD
to get C which is outsourced to CSP.
• Index Generation: User generates I and sends it
together with C to CSP.
• Storage Enforcement: CSP firstly checks and stores
I and C. Then,CSP generates a digital signature accord-
ing to C and stores the signature on the blockchain.
Finally, CSP sends such information to User that helps
User to get the signature from the blockchain.
• Storage Confirmation: Upon getting the signature
from the blockchain, User thinks that C has been stored
by CSP.
3) DATA SEARCH PHASE
In this phase, CSP searches his/her storage according to the
requirements of User. It can be ensured that CSP earns
search fees fromUser if and only ifUser obtains valid search
results. Four sequential sub-phases are performed, including
search request, search commitment, payment commitment,
and verification and payment.
• Search Request:User generates a search request based
on W and sends it to CSP. Besides, the compensation
and penalty of CSP in the case of invalid search should
be specified by User and CSP.
• Search Commitment: This phase is used by CSP to
commit to that if search results cannot meet the require-
ments specified in Search Request and malicious CSP
refuses to compensate User in the subsequent phase
Verification and Payment before a given time, User is
able to claim enough deposits ofCSP by himself/herself
as a penalty in the subsequent User Claim Phase after
the given time.
• Payment Commitment: User commits to CSP that if
the search result is valid,CSP is able to earn search fees
in Verification and Payment. It is realized by temporarily
freezing a deposit consists of service fee from User,
in which the search requirements are specified.
• Verification and Payment: To demonstrate that he/she
agrees with the search requirements of User, CSP fur-
ther freezes a deposit consists of his/her guaranty.2 Then,
CSP earns the service fee of User by providing search
results and proving that the search result meets the
requirements of User. Finally, User gets search results
from the proof of CSP and decrypts them to obtain
original documents.
2At this time, honest User is capable of ensuring that either a valid search
result is obtained later by paying the service fee or enough deposits are
claimed in User Claim Phase no matter how CSP behaves. Honest CSP
can ensure that if the search result is valid he/she will earn the service fee no
matter how User behaves.
4) USER CLAIM PHASE
Only if CSP fails to prove that the search result meets the
requirements of User before the given time, TKSE comes
to User Claim Phase. It is used by User to claim enough
deposits of CSP no matter how CSP behaves.
V. TRUSTWORTHY SEARCH OVER ENCRYPTED DATA
In this section, we first give an overview of TKSE, and then
describe its design in detail.
A. HIGH LEVEL DESCRIPTION
In TKSE, privacy is realized similar to the SSE scheme [5].
The scheme [5] realizes user-side verifiability by designing
indexes based on a message authentication code (MAC) with
a secret key. Because the MAC secret key is only known by
User, the server-side verifiability cannot be achieved in [5].
Furthermore, the idea in [5] cannot be directly combined with
Blockchain technologies in that the condition of redeeming
search fees should be specified by User and CSP and it
requires the MAC secret key. If CSP gets the secret key,
he/she can generate ‘‘search results’’ arbitrarily and ensure
they can pass the user-side verifiability, which violates pay-
ment fairness. In TKSE, we build the index based on a signa-
ture scheme and hash functions instead of MAC. In this case,
although CSP is able to publicly check the search results,
he/she cannot forge valid search results arbitrarily because of
the unforgeability of the digital signature and the collision-
resistance of hash functions. In order to eliminate TTP and
realize compatibility with typical blockchains especially the
Bitcoin blockchain, we exploit ECDSA in TKSE.
B. DESIGN DETAILS OF TKSE
1) INITIALIZATION
Let pi0 be a pseudo-random permutation,
pi0 : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}1+`w+`→ {0, 1}1+`w+`,
where λ is a security parameter, `w is the bit length of a
keyword, and ` represents the bit length of a document with
N = 2`. User chooses K0 ∈ {0, 1}λ as a key of pi0 and
defines pi (·) = pi0(K0, ·). In addition, User chooses a secure
cryptographic hash function H and a symmetric encryption
scheme with functions
(KeyGenSE,EncryptSE,DecryptSE),
and setsKSE = KeyGenSE(1λ). Finally, we assumeUser and
CSP choose their own ECDSA public and secret key pairs,
denoted by (pkU , skU ) and (pkS , skS ), respectively.CSP pre-
pares an unredeemed transaction TxSsig of value dsig B, which
can be redeemed with skS . User sets K = (K0,KSE, skU ) as
his/her secret key.
2) DATA STORAGE PHASE
The outsourcing ofD is implemented based on the following
four procedures.
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Algorithm 1 BuildIndex(K ,D, C,W)→ I
Input: secret key K , document set D, ciphertext data set
C, keyword setW
Output: index I
1 for i ∈ [num] do
2 I(i) = (dummy, sigU (i ‖ H (dummy)))
3 end
4 for ω ∈W do
5 Suppose Dω = {Ds1 ,Ds2 , . . . ,Dsm}.
6 for j ∈ [m] do
7 addrω,j = pi (0, ω, j)
8 tagω,j = sigU (addrω,j ‖ H (Csj )),
9 I(addrω,j) = (sj, tagω,j)
10 end
11 end
12 for Dk ∈ D do
13 Suppose k has already appeared Nk times in I.
14 if Nk 6= 2`w then
15 for 1 ≤ r ≤ 2`w − Nk do
16 addrr,k = pi (1, r, k)
17 tagr,k = sigU (addrr,k ‖ H (Ck ))
18 I(addrr,k ) = (k, tagr,k )
19 end
20 end
21 Now, the index k appears 2`w times in I.
22 end
23 return I
• Data Encryption: For i ∈ [N ], User computes
Ci = EncryptSE(KSE,Di).
Then C = {Ci}i∈[N ] will be outsourced to CSP.
• Index Generation: User generates I based on
BuildIndex as shown in Algorithm 1 and sends I
together with C to CSP, where I is an array of size
21+`w+`1=num.
• Storage Enforcement: CSP stores I and C after
ensuring the validness based on signature verification.
Furthermore, to earn search fees of User in the subse-
quent phases, a Merkle tree T is built by CSP, where
the leaf nodes consist of C. An example of N = 8 is
shown in Figure 3, where
hi = H (Ci), hi,j = H (hi ‖ hj)
and Iroot = H (h1−4 ‖ h5−8) with h1−4 = H (h1,2 ‖
h3,4) and h5−8 = H (h5,6 ‖ h7,8). Furthermore, CSP
computes σroot = sigS (Iroot), and stores σroot on the
blockchain by broadcasting a search signature transac-
tion TxSearchSig as illustrated in Figure 4. Finally,
CSP sends the transaction ID to User.
• Storage Confirmation: Upon receiving the transac-
tion ID from CSP, User first gets σroot from the
blockchain. Then, User computes Iroot based on C.
If verS (Iroot, σroot) = true, User thinks C has been
FIGURE 3. The construction of data tree.
FIGURE 4. The search signature transaction TxSearchSig.
FIGURE 5. The search commitment transaction TxSearchCommit.
stored by CSP. User deletes D, C and just stores ` and
the transaction ID as metadata.
3) DATA SEARCH PHASE
It is introduced based on the following four procedures.
• Search Request: Suppose User wants to search doc-
uments with a keyword ω ∈ W , he/she generates a
trapdoor Tω based on Trapdoor as below and sends Tω
to CSP. Note that Tω is used as a search request.
Trapdoor(K , ω) → Tω: Taking the secret key K and a
keyword ω as inputs, User outputs
Tω = (pi (0, ω, 1), pi(0, ω, 2), . . . , pi (0, ω,N )).
Besides, CSP prepares an unredeemed transaction TxS0
of value d0 B, which can be redeemed by skS and is
used as his/her penalty in the case of invalid search.
Furthermore, suppose there are unredeemed transactions
TxU1 of value d
U
1 B and Tx
S
1 of value d
S
1 B, which can be
redeemed by User and CSP, respectively. In order to
force CSP to compensate User before a specific time
once the search is invalid, let d0 ≥ dU1 + dS1 . Note
that, dU1 B and d
S
1 B denote the search fee of User and
the compensation of CSP in the case of search failure,
respectively.
• Search Commitment: Upon receiving Tω, CSP per-
forms CS.Commit(CSP,User, d0, t, rS ), where rS ∈R
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FIGURE 6. The joint verification and payment transaction TxVeriPay.
{0, 1}∗. Specifically, CSP posts a deposit transaction
TxSearchCommit of value d0 B on the blockchain,
which commits to that once the search result cannotmeet
the requirements specified in Search Request and mali-
cious CSP refuses to compensate User in Verification
and Payment before time t ,User is able to claim enough
deposits of CSP by himself/herself as a penalty in the
subsequentUser Claim Phase after time t . The details of
TxSearchCommit are shown in Figure 5, where hS =
H (rS ).
Once TxSearchCommit is included on the blockchain,
CSP creates the body of the punishment transaction
TxFine, whichwill be used byUser to claim the penalty,
signs it and sends the signed body sigS ([TxFine]) to
User. TxOpen and TxFine will be detailed in Verifica-
tion and Payment and User Claim Phase, respectively.
Certainly, if the search is valid, CSP will eventually get
his/her deposit back no matter how User behaves. In
particular, CSP performs the search algorithm Search
described inAlgorithm 2 to obtain Cω and tagω. Suppose
Cω = {Csi}i∈Iω . CSP sets Hω = {H (Csi )}i∈Iω and
pathω = Hω ∪ AIω, where AIω represents the set
of auxiliary node values of Hω in T . Take the case of
N = 8 and Cω = {C1,C6} as an example, as shown
in Figure 3. We know Hω = {h1, h6} and AIω =
{h2, h5, h3,4, h7,8}. It’s noted that the root value can be
easily recovered based on pathω, which is sent to User
by CSP.
• Payment Commitment: Once TxSearchCommit is
included on the blockchain, and sigS ([TxFine]) and
pathω are received,Usermakes a payment commitment
that CSP is able to get corresponding search fee if the
search result is valid inVerification and Payment. In fact,
User performs the following procedures:
Algorithm 2 Search(I, C,Tω)→ (Cω, tagω)
Input: index I, ciphertext data set C, trapdoor Tω
Output: ciphertext data set Cω and tag set tagω with
respect to ω
1 Let Cω = ∅.
2 Parse Tω = (addrω,1,addrω,2, . . . ,addrω,N ).
3 for j ∈ [N ] do
4 parse I(addrω,j) = (sj, tagω,j)
5 if sj 6= dummy then
6 set Cω = Cω ∪ Csj
7 end
8 end
9 Set tagω = (tagω,1, tagω,2, . . . , tagω,N ).
10 return Cω and tagω
– Compute Iroot based on pathω.
– Parse pathω = Hω ∪AIω andHω = {H (Csi )}i∈Iω .
– Check if verS (Iroot, σroot) = true, where σroot can
be obtained from the blockchain based onmetadata.
If it is, User proceeds. Otherwise, User quits.
– Define h∗j = H (Csj ) for j ∈ Iω and h∗j = H (dummy)
for j ∈ [N ]− Iω.
– SetMω = {mω,j}j∈[N ], wheremω,j = addrω,j ‖ h∗j .
– Choose single variable x and two variable sets chal1
and chal2, where
chal1 = {c1,j}j∈Iω , chal2 = {c2,j}j∈[N ].
– Create the body of the joint deposit transaction
TxVeriPay, as illustrated in Figure 7, signs it and
sends the signed body sigU ([TxVeriPay]) to CSP.
In Figure 7, check1 and check2 are defined as
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FIGURE 7. The joint verification and payment transaction TxVeriPay.
follows:
check1(chal1,Hω) = ∧j∈IωH (c1,j) = h∗j ,
check2(chal2,Mω) = ∧j∈[N ]verU (mω,j, c2,j).
Note thatVeriPay specifies the search requirements
of User and is finally posted on the blockchain by
CSP.
• Verification and Payment: Upon sigU ([TxVeriPay])
is received, CSP further signs the body of TxVeriPay
and puts it on the blockchain. As shown in Figure 7,
the joint deposit in TxVeriPay consists of the search
fee dU1 B from User and the guaranty d
S
1 B from CSP,
where the guaranty is used as the compensation in User
Claim Phase.
In order to earn the search fee dU1 B of User and get
his/her guaranty dS1 B back, CSP redeems TxVeriPay
based on transactions TxSearchFee and TxGuaranty
as described in Figure 7, respectively. CSP has to pro-
vide a valid search result consists of SearchResult1
and SearchResult2 before time t − 2maxB to prove
that they meet the requirements of User. In fact, CSP
sets SearchResult1 = Cω and SearchResult2 = tagω
based on Algorithm 2.
Besides,CSP performsCS.Open(CSP,User, d0, t, rS ),
in which CSP opens the search commitment made
in Search Commitment by posting the opening trans-
action TxOpen on the blockchain before time t . The
detail of TxOpen is shown in Figure 7, which redeems
TxSearchCommit and hence CSP can get his/her
commitment deposit back.User gets search results from
SearchResult1 = Cω. Note that, User can ensure
the validness of SearchResult1 based on Verify as
described in Algorithm 3. Finally, CSP obtains doc-
ument set Dω = {Dsi}i∈Iω and quits, where Dsi =
DecryptSE(KSE,Csi ).
4) USER CLAIM PHASE
Suppose CSP fails to prove that the search result meets the
requirements of User before time t − 2maxB, TKSE comes
to User Claim Phase. It is used by User to claim enough
deposits of CSP no matter how CSP behaves. We consider
the following two cases.
• Case 1.CSP refuses to pay the compensation of dS1 B to
User. User performs CS.Fine(CSP,User, d0, t, rS ),
in which User gets the penalty d0 B by posting the
punishment transaction TxFine on the blockchain, and
then quits. The detail of TxFine is given in Figure 8.
• Case 2. CSP refuses to pay the penalty of d0 B
to User. User gets both the refund dU1 B and the
Algorithm 3 Verify(Tω, Cω, tagω)→ 1 or 0
Input: trapdoor Tω, ciphertext data set Cω and tag set
tagω related to ω
Output: accept(1) or reject(0)
1 Parse Tω = (addrω,1,addrω,2, . . . ,addrω,N ).
2 Parse Cω = {Csi}i∈Iω .
3 Parse tagω = (tagω,1, tagω,2, . . . , tagω,N ).
4 for j ∈ [N ] do
5 if j ∈ Iω then
6 set h∗j = H (Csj )
7 else
8 set h∗j = H (dummy)
9 end
10 if verU (addrω,j ‖ h∗j , tagω,j) = false then
11 return 0
12 end
13 end
14 return 1
FIGURE 8. The punishment transaction TxFine.
compensation dS1 B by immediately putting the refund
transaction TxRefund and the compensation transac-
tion TxCompensation on the blockchain, respectively.
Then User quits. TxRefund and TxCompensation are
explained in Figure 7.
VI. SECURITY, COMPATIBILITY AND
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND COMPATIBILITY
TKSE is secure based on Theorem 1, Theorem 3 and Theo-
rem 2 and it achieves compatibility based on Theorem 4.
Theorem 1 (Privacy and User-Side Verifiability): TKSE
satisfies privacy and user-side verifiability if the adopted
hash function H is collision-resistant, the symmetric key
encryption scheme has left-or-right indistinguishability as
defined by [46] and the ECDSA signature is unforgeable
under chosen message attacks.
Proof: We know from Section V that an underlying
V-SSE scheme is used in TKSE. In particular, V-SSE is
designed based on[5] and [21]. Specifically, based on the
SSE scheme [21], the scheme [5] further realizes verification
of search results by designing indexes based on MAC with
a secret key. In V-SSE, we generate indexes based on H
and ECDSA. Therefore, if H is collision-resistant, it directly
follows from the unforgeability of ECDSA signature and
MAC that V-SSE has the same security as [5]. Based on the
security of [5], we know that TKSE satisfies privacy and user-
side verifiability as described in Theorem 1. 
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TABLE 2. Feature comparison of SSE schemes.
Theorem 2 (Server-Side Verifiability): TKSE satisfies
server-side verifiability if the adopted hash function H is
collision-resistant and the ECDSA signature is unforgeable
under chosen message attacks.
Proof: In the data storage phase of TKSE, after receiv-
ing ciphertext data set C and index I from User, CSP firstly
performs ECDSA verification to ensure the validness of C
and index I. Then, the storage enforcement procedure is
performed by CSP. Therefore, if H is collision-resistant,
it directly follows from the public verifiability and unforge-
ability of the ECDSA signature that TKSE satisfies server-
side verifiability. 
Theorem 3 (Fair Payment and No TTP): TKSE realizes
fair payment without needing any TTP if the adopted hash
function H is collision-resistant and the ECDSA signature is
unforgeable under chosen message attacks.
Proof: In TKSE, pubic blockchains are introduced.
Therefore, eavesdropping attacks may be made by a mali-
cious party to undermine the fairness of the honest party. In
the following, we consider two cases.
Suppose User is honest and CSP is malicious. In this
case, CSP wants to obtain search fees from User with-
out returning a search result satisfying the requirements of
User before time t − 2maxB. At the same time, CSP can-
not pay compensation or penalty to User. If User does
not get a valid search result, the joint deposit transac-
tion TxVeriPay cannot be redeemed by CSP based on
TxSearchFee and TxGuaranty before time t − 2maxB in
the verification and payment phase. According to the defini-
tions of check1, check2 in the payment commitment phase
and SearchResult1, SearchResult2 in the verification and
payment phase, we know CSP cannot obtain the search fee
dC1 B from User unless CSP is able to forge an ECDSA
signature or find a collision of the hash function H . To be
specific, if CSP refuses to pay the compensation dS1 B to
User, which means CSP does not open the search commit-
ment by broadcasting TxOpen based on CS.Open before
time t , User performs CS.Fine, in which User obtains the
penalty d0 B with d0 ≥ dC1 + dS1 by posting the punishment
transaction TxFine on the blockchain. On the other hand,
if CSP refuses to pay the penalty to User, which means
CSP opens the search commitment by performingCS.Open
to post TxOpen on the blockchain before time t , User can
claim both the refund dC1 B and the compensation d
S
1 B by
postingTxRefund andTxCompensation on the blockchain,
respectively. Obviously, in any case, if CSP cannot return a
valid search result, User is able to claim enough compensa-
tion besides the search fee refund or penalty from CSP no
matter how CSP behaves. Similarly, payment fairness can
also be realized ifUser is malicious. Therefore, fair payment
is enabled in TKSEwithout needing any TTP ifH is collision-
resistant and ECDSA is unforgeable under chosen message
attacks. 
Theorem 4 (Compatibility): TKSE is compatible with the
Bitcoin blockchain and the Ethereum blockchain.
Proof: It easily follows from the design details of TKSE
in Section V that the operations, which have to be performed
on blockchains such as hashing and ECDSA verification, are
allowed by Bitcoin and Ethereum [44], [45]. Accordingly,
compatibility is realized in TKSE. 
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we first make a feature comparison between
TKSE and previous SSE schemes. Then, we evaluate
the performance of TKSE in terms of the number of
transactions.
1) FEATURE COMPARISON
In this section, we compare TKSE with [5], [21], [35], [37],
[38] in terms of Privacy, User-side Verifiability, Server-side
Verifiability, Payment Fairness, No TTP and Compatibility.
We use the symbol ‘‘–’’ to represent that the correspond-
ing property is not considered. As shown in Table 2, the
scheme [21] cannot realize user-side verifiability, and server-
side verifiability is only obtained in TKSE. In other words,
TKSE is the first SSE scheme supporting two-side veri-
fiability. Only schemes [35], [37], [38] and TKSE intro-
duce blockchain technologies into SSE. However, only the
scheme [35] and TKSE do not need any TTP, and only TKSE
enables fair payment. Additionally, only TKSE is compatible
with Bitcoin and Ethereum.
2) NUMBER OF TRANSACTIONS
The number of transactions in blockchain-based solutions has
an important effect on performance. We further analyze and
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FIGURE 9. The number of transactions in a data storage and search phase.
compare the number of transactions in the blockchain-based
SSE scheme [35] (Li et al.’s scheme) and TKSE, in which
TTP is not needed. We consider a data storage and search
phase based on the Bitcoin blockchain in the normal case.
Suppose the size of each document is 40 bytes, which is
equal to the output size of the opcode OP_RETURN in
Bitcoin. In [35], suppose SHA-1 is used. In the data storage
phase, nd + nk2 transactions are created by User, where
nd is the number of documents and nk is the number of
keywords. In the data search phase, User and CSP cre-
ate two and three transactions, respectively. As for TKSE,
only one transaction TxSearchSig in involved in the Data
Storage Phase. In the Data Search Phase, the transaction
TxSearchCommit is created in the search commitment pro-
cedure. In the verification and payment procedure, transac-
tions TxVeriPay, TxSearchFee, TxGuaranty and TxOpen
are created. Note that TxOpen is created by CSP and it
is not related to data search in the normal case. In the
User Claim Phase, either the transaction TxFine or trans-
actions TxRefund and TxCompensation are needed. Note
that TxRefund and TxCompensation can be replaced with
one transaction because they only need signatures of User.
Similarly, TxSearchFee and TxGuaranty can be combined
into one transaction. As shown in Figure 9, the number of
involved transactions in TKSE is small and constant, which
is not affected by the number of documents and keywords.
VII. CONCLUSION
Aiming to realize secure keyword search over encrypted
data against malicious users and malicious cloud service
providers, we proposed TKSE, a trustworthy keyword search
scheme over encrypted cloud storage without needing any
TTP. In TKSE, besides privacy and user-side verifiability,
server-side verifiability is enabled for the first time in the
literature, which protects honest cloud servers from being
framed by malicious data owners in the data storage phase. In
addition, fair payment is fulfilled based on blockchain tech-
nologies and hash functions without introducing any TTP.
Our security analysis and performance evaluation indicated
that TKSE is secure and efficient.
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